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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO 
TWO JINN, INC., a California corporation duly ) 
qualified to do business in Idaho and doing ) 
business as Aladdin Bail Bonds and Anytime ) Supreme Court No. 36476 
Bail Bonds; JAMES GARSKE; and 1 ) Fourth Judicial District 
SHANTARA CARLOCK, ) Case No. CV OC 070661 9 
Plaintiffs-Respondents-Cross Appellants, f 1 
VS. 1 1 
DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH 1 
JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF 
IDAHO; DARLA S. WILLIAMSON, in her 1 > 
official capacity as Administrative District Judge 
for the District Court of the Fourth Judicial 1 
District; LARRY D. REINER, in his official ) 
capacity as Trial C o w  Administrator for the ) 
District Court of the Fourth Judicial District; and 
DIANE BURRELL, in her capacity as Assistant 
Trial Court Administrator for the District Court 
of the Fourth Judicial District, 
1 
1 
Defendants-Appellants-Cross Respondents. 
1 
+ 
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Appeal from the District Court of the 
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1. 
INTRODUCTION 
This brief addresses three points raised in Respondents' Appellate Brief. 
First, Respondents assure this Court that there is no need to worry about bail 
agents being in control of the courtroom or running amok. Not true. Legislative trends, 
as well as the evolution of the Fourth Judicial District's Bail Bond Guidelines 
("Guidelines") themselves, reveal a transfer in power from the courts to bail agencies and 
individual bail agents, which increases the potential for corruption in bail bonding. 
Second, Respondents argue that the Fourth Judicial District's decision to refuse to 
accept bonds from certain bail agents is "substantive" versus "procedural," and therefore 
outside the scope of the Administrative District Judge's ("ADJ's") authority under Idaho 
Code 5 1-907. This brief discusses the ADJ's authority under Section 1-907, which 
includes the authority to issue the Guidelines at issue here. 
Finally, Respondents raise the problem of the individual bail agent who leaves one 
bail agency to work for a different bail agency, but remains off the list of approved agents 
due to his prior agency's failure to pay a forfeited bond. As discussed below, the 
Guidelines may appropriately hold an individual bail agent accountable for his or her 
actions. 
11. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In the Cross-Appellants' Opening Brief, Aladdin wrote that the "Guidelines make 
no attempt to approve sureties or bail bond businesses and, instead, their scope is strictly 
limited to the regulation of individual bail agents and supervising bail agents." Cross- 
Appellants' Opening Brief, p. 2. That is a true statement regarding the Guidelines that 
were presented to the District Court. After the District Court issued its opinion in this 
case, however, the Fourth Judicial District amended its Guidelines, and the current 
Guidelines for the Fourth Judicial District do regulate sureties. R., Exhibit 54', Afldavit 
of Melissa Moody filed June 2, 2009. 
ARGUMENT 
A. Legislative Trends, as Welt as the Evolution of the Guidelines' Themselves, 
Reveal a Transfer in Power from the Courts to Bail Agencies in Matters 
Pertaining to Bail 
In its opening brief, the Fourth District pointed out that the U.S. Supreme Court 
has recognized that it is the courts, not bondsmen, who should be in control of the 
workings of the bail system. Appellants' Opening Brief, p.12. In response, Aladdin 
wrote: 
The Bail Plaintiffs have not argued that "bondsman" should control the bail 
system as asserted by the Fourth District but, rather, that the legislature was 
entitled to authorize surety insurance companies to become the sole surety 
on bail bonds and that the legislature is entitled to regulate bail agents for 
the protection for the public. 
Respondents' Brief, p. 37. This is a good response. It focuses attention on the 
Legislature's purported authority, without acknowledging that bondsmen may indeed 
' The motion to include this Adininist~ative Order in the record on appeal was never ruled on by the District Cou~t .  
R., Vol. 111, p. 566. 
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ultimately control the courts in matters pertaining to bail, if the Legislature is willing to 
give that power to bondsmen, and if questions of bail are wholly committed to legislative 
- not judicial - authority. Recently, the Legislature has given more power to bail 
agencies and individual bondsmen, and has taken that power from the courts. Aladdin 
summarized this trend succinctly: "[elven if the former Idaho Code 5 19-2909 entitled 
the Fourth District to regulate individual bail agents, it no longer exists." Respondents' 
Brief, p. 39. 
It is one thing when the Legislature passes new bail laws, repealing old legislation. 
It is quite another when the Legislature passes new bail laws that conflict with Guidelines 
issued pursuant to an Order of the Idaho Supreme Court, precluding courts from 
regulating in an area that has historically been reserved for the courts. 
For example, under the Guidelines in effect in the Fourth Judicial District in 1990, 
default judgments were issued on forfeited bonds by the court clerk one day after the 90 
day time period for returning a defendant to court. 1990 Guidelines for the Fourth 
Judicial District, Section ~ 1 1 1 . '  Recently, the time for returning a defendant to court was 
legislatively expanded to 180 days, with no ability for the court clerk to seek a "default" 
judgment if the forfeited bond was not paid. Idaho Code $ 5  19-2917, 19-2918. Under 
current legislation, the bondsman or bail agency can postpone the time for paying on a 
forfeited bond well beyond the 180 days by simply filing a motion to set aside the order 
of forfeiture or a motion to exonerate bail. Idaho Code § 19-291 8. 
A copy of the 1990 Guidelines are attached to this brief for the Court's convenience. The Court may take judicial 
notice of the Fourth Judicial District's 1990 Guidelines. See State v. Howell, 122 Idaho 209, 213, 832 P.2d i 144, 
1148 (1992); Trautman v. Hill, 116 Idaho 337,340,775 P.2d 651,654 (Ct. App. 1989). 
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Aladdin assures this Court there is no need to worry about bail agents running 
amok. According to Aladdin, the Fourth District's vision is "alarmist" because: ( 1 )  a bail 
agent may be removed from the list if the surety on whose behalf the bail agent is posting 
bonds is insolvent or has an outstanding forfeiture, and (2) the Department of Insurance 
("DOI") may revoke the agent's license. Respondents' Brief, pp. 21-22. These 
assurances are inadequate. 
With respect to removing bail agents from the list if the surety on whose behalf the 
bail agent is posting bonds has an outstanding forfeiture, Aladdin's position is internally 
inconsistent. On the one hand, Aladdin offers this portion of the Guidelines as an 
assurance that bail agents will not run amok. On the other hand, Aladdin asks the Court 
to strike down this very portion of the Guidelines because, according to Aladdin, it 
improperly makes bail agents "co-sureties" on bonds. 
As for Aladdin's second point - that the DO1 may revoke an agent's license for 
abusive practices - this is a drop in the remedial bucket. "The studies of the systemic 
problems associated with the financially-based bail system and other independent 
investigations revealed widespread abuses and corruption in the commercial bondsman 
system, including the infiltration of criminals and organized crime into the bonding 
business, bondsman payoffs to police and court officials, and failure to pay off forfeited 
bonds." Peggy M. Tobolowsky, Pretrial Release in the 1990s: Texas Takes Another 
Look at Nonfinanciul Release Conditions, 19 New Eng. J. on Crim. & Civ. Confinement 
267, 275, 11.40, Summer 1993. It is not particularly reassuring to know that, after a bail 
agent has defrauded the courts and/or individual criminal defendants with abusive 
bonding practices, the bail agent's license might be revoked by the DOT. It is similar to 
telling people they need not fear a plane crash because, in the event of a crash, the pilot 
may have his license revoked. 
There are no guarantees that abusive bail practices can be adequately policed by 
Executive Department licensing. US.  v. Brock, 501 F.3d 762 (61h Cir. 2007). In an 
environment of uncertainty, in which bail agents are afforded a great deal of power, it 
makes the most sense to have the courts - those interacting with and monitoring bail 
agents on a daily basis - control those agents' interaction with the court system directly. 
Whether the courts have the authority in matters pertaining to bail to adequately protect 
themselves, criminal defendants, and the public, is an issue before this Court in this case. 
If Aladdin's position in this lawsuit is correct, then there is nothing that this Court 
can do to restore any control in the Fourth Judicial District, because all of the power to 
regulate matters pertaining to bail rests in the Legislature. If Aladdin's position is not 
correct - and this Court has said as much previously3 - then this Court should articulate 
the scope of the ADJ's authority to regulate matters pertaining to bail. 
In State v. Currington, 108 Idaho 539, 700 P.2d 942 (1985), this Court quoted a Washington state court opinion 
approvingly, which stated in part, "...we believe it to be implicit that the right to bail is essentially procedural in 
nature ... Thus the right to baii (and release) after verdict ... is governed solely by the provisions of CrR.3.2.(h))." In 
Currington, this Court wrote: "[tlhe fixing of bail and release from custody are matters traditionally within the 
discretion of the courts." Id. at 541,700 P.2d at 944. 
Aladdin acknowledges Currington in its Brief, but Aladdin's summary may leave the misimpression that it is only 
the "fixing" of bail that is a procedural matter. "Fixing bail relates to the manner of ensuring that the alleged 
offense will be heard by the court and thus is a procedural matter within the inherent discretion of the courts." 
Respondents' Brief, p. 16 (emphasis added). See also Cross-Appellants' Opening Brief, p. 8 (containing the same 
quote). 
Aladdin's narrowing of the Court's language in Currington, which acknowledged courts' authority to not just fix 
bail, but to govern the right to bail and release from custody, is inconsistent with this Court's Order from 2005 
giving ADJs the authority to establish guidelines for bail bonds for posting, forfeiture, exoneration, and all other 
matters pertaining to bail. 
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B. The Guidelines Are Procedural and a Proper Exercise of the Administrative 
District Judge's Authority Under Idaho Code § 1-907 
Idaho Code 5 1-907 states: 
ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE - ADMINISTRATIVE POWERS AND DUTIES. The 
administrative judge or acting administrative judge in each judicial district, subject to the 
rules of the Supreme Court, shall have administrative supervision and authority over the 
operation of the district courts and magistrates in the district. These powers and duties 
include, but are not limited to, the following: 
(a) arranging schedules and assigning district judges for sessions of district courts; 
(b) arranging or supervising the calendaring of matters for trial or hearing; 
(c) supervising the clerks of the district courts in the discharge of the clerical 
functions of the district courts; 
(d) assigning matters to magistrates, and prescribing times and places at which 
magistrates shall be available for the performance of their duties; 
(e) making arrangements with proper authorities for the drawing of civil jury 
panels and determining which sessions of the district court shall be jury 
sessions; 
(f) arranging for the reporting of civil cases by court reporters or other authorized 
means; 
(g) arranging sessions, to the extent practicable, for the trial of specialized cases, 
including traffic, domestic relations, and other types of  cases, and assigning 
district judges to preside over these sessions so as to permit maximum 
practicable specialization by individual judges; 
(h) promulgating a schedule of offenses for which magistrates and clerks of court 
or other designated persons may accept written appearances, waivers of trial, 
and please of guilty, and establishing a schedule of fines and bails therefor; 
(i) assigning magistrates to temporary duty outside the county of their residence, 
but within the district; 
0) acting as chairman of the district magistrates cornmission of the district; 
(k) assigning to other district judges in the district various powers and duties as in 
this act provided; and 
(1) appointing personnel when needed to attend to the courts, and assigning duties 
to these court attendants for the purpose of maintaining the security and 
efficiency of court facilities. 
Aladdin contends that the Guidelines are beyond the scope of the ADJ's authority 
under Idaho Code 5 1-907 because the Guidelines affect the substantive rights of bail 
agents. Respondents' Brief, pp. 17-18. Aladdin wrote that the Fourth District "conceded 
that the Guidelines are substantive in nature." Respondents' Brief, p. 23. The 
"concession" referenced by Aladdin is this quote from the Fourth District's briefing on 
summary judgment: 
Defendants deny that the Guidelines make bail agents co-sureties. 
(See Judge Williamson 7/10/08 Affidavit, at 2. ("The Bail Bond 
Guidelines do not make an individual agent a 'co-surety' on a bond.") 
Defendants do not deny that the Guidelines are substantive in nature, 
The Guidelines are a contract and, as a contract, the Guidelines necessarily 
contain substantive terms. The Plaintiffs agree with this position: "The 
Bail Bond Guidelines that create a contractual relationship between 
individual bail agents and the court are substantive in nature." First 
Amended Complaint, at f j  10. 
R., Exhibit 32, Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment 
jled September 5, 2008, p. 10. To clarify the Fourth District's position, as set forth 
above: to the extent that the Guidelines are a contract, they are substantive in nature. 
However, the Guidelines are not the promulgation of substantive law. Even assuming, 
for the sake of argument that bail agents have substantive rights to write bail bonds in a 
particular judicial district: and that the bail agents' rights are somehow affected by the 
Guidelines; nevertheless, the Guidelines promulgated by the Fourth Judicial District 
govern exactly the type of policy and procedure that fall squarely within the authority of 
Idaho Code 3 1-907. 
The Fourth Judicial District has argued at length that bail agents possess no property interest in writing bonds in a 
particular judicial district. See Appellants' Opening Brief, p. 17 and Cross Respondents' Brief, pp. 2-5. 
The fact that a procedural rule may affect a substantive right does not make the 
rule a substantive one. See State, ex re. Silcott v. Spahv, 552 N.E.2d 926 (Ohio 1990) 
(holding that the right to apply for bail is a substantive right, but the Court's procedural 
rules - not statutes - regulate that right); see also State v. Gveev, 530 N.E.2d 382 (Ohio 
1988) (holding that the right to peremptorily challenge jurors during voir dire is a 
substantive right, but the numerical limitation on challenges imposed by a rule of 
criminal procedure reasonably regulated it). There are many areas under Idaho Code $ 
1-907 in which an ADJ's procedural rules might appear to conflict with substantive 
rights. 
Subsection ( f )  provides perhaps the closest analogy to the facts in this case. Under 
subsection (0, an ADJ may arrange for the reporting of civil cases by court reporters or 
other means. The authority to arrange for certain court reporters to provide services to 
litigants presumably includes the authority to not arrange for certain court reporters to 
provide services to litigants. The ADJ may aIso arrange for the reporting of civil cases 
by "other means." Thus, if the ADJ determined that a certain court reporter was 
backlogged on hislher workload, or tendering substandard work, the ADJ could decide to 
not schedule that reporter for work. The ADJ has this authority even though court 
reporters are required to be licensed (Idaho Code $ 54-3103), and inay have a vested 
property right in their court reporter license. The ADJ's authority to regulate court 
reporters is similar to its authority to regulate bail agents, and both are proper under Idaho 
Code $ 1-907. 
After the District Court issued its decision in this case, a federal district court in 
Missouri specifically held that "revoking a bail bond agent's privilege to write bail bonds 
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in a judge's court or circuit is a judicial action, i.e. an act taken in the judge's judicial 
capacity." Peak v. Richardson, 2008 WL 7621 10 at *8 (E.D. Missouri, March 19, 2008). 
In the Missouri case, the bail plaintiffs argued that "the regulatory scheme in the 
[Missouri bail bond] Act, including those sections governing the application and 
revocation procedures for bailbond agents, 'trumps' the Missouri Supreme Court Rules." 
Id. at "7. In support of this argument the bail plaintiffs cited American Druggists Ins. Co. 
v. Bogart, 707 F.2d 1229 (1 1" Cir. 1983), which Aladdin also cites. Respondents' Brief, 
p. 36. Missouri's federal district court rejected these arguments, noting that Missouri 
Supreme Court Rules took precedence over the statutes in the bail case before it. The 
court wrote: 
Considering the relevant statutes, the Missouri Supreme Court Rules, and 
the trial court's obligation to enforce those rules, it becomes apparent that 
Defendants are permitted, if not required, to determine whether bail 
bond agents writing bonds in their courts are reputable. 
Id. at *8 (emphasis addeq. 
The ADJ in this case has the obligation to enforce the Idaho Supreme Court's 
Rules regarding bail. Idaho Code § 1-907 does not limit the ADJ's authority to enforce 
the Idaho Supreme Court's rules. The Guidelines at issue in this case are a proper 
exercise of the ADJ's authority under Idaho Code $ 1-907. 
C. The Guidelines May Hold an Individual Bail Agent Accountable for His or 
Her Actions 
Aladdin argues, and the District Court held, that the Fourth District Guidelines 
make an individual bail agent a "co-surety" on bail bonds, in violation of the separation 
of powers doctrine. The District Court's holding is based upon the portion of the 
Guidelines that permits a bail agent to be removed from the list if the bail agent's surety 
has not paid a forfeited bond. The district court characterized this portion of the 
Guidelines as holding the lowest level of the food chain (bail agent) hostage to the 
actions of the entities liable on the bail bond. R., Vol. 111, p. 478. In its brief on appeal, 
Aladdin explains what it calls the basic unfairness resulting from the Guidelines: "Thus, 
a bail agent who leaves employment with another bail bond company and begins 
employment with Aladdin will be prohibited from working in the Fourth Judicial District 
if the other company's surety fails to pay the forfeiture of the bond which the agent 
posted for the other company prior to employment with Aladdin." Respondents' Brief, 
p. 4. 
This Court touched upon a similar argument in Leadev v. Reiner, 143 Idaho 635, 
151 P.3d 831 (2007). In that case a bail agent argued that once he left his employment 
with one bail bond company, "he was no longer an agent of the surety company that was 
liable on the bail bond posted" and therefore, could not have arrested the criminal 
defendant. Id. at 835, 151 P.3d 831. This Court held that, under the common law 
authority granted to bail bondsmen, as well as the (then) statutory law under Idaho Code 
5 19-2925, the bail agent had the authority to arrest the criminal defendant.5 
The code section relied upon by this Court in Leader read: "Arrest of defendant for surrender. -For the purpose 
o f  surrendering the defendant, the bail, at any time before they are finally discharged, and at any place within the 
state, may themselves arrest him, or by a written authority endorsed on a certified copy of the undertaking may 
empower any person of suitable age and discretion to do so." ldaho Code 5 19-2925. 
The new version of this act reads: 
ARREST OF DEFENDANT FOR SURRENDER. At any time before the exoneration of bail, the surety insurance 
company or its bail agent or the person posting a property bond or cash deposit may empower any person of suitable 
age and discretion to arrest the defendant at any place within the state by signing an affidavit extending such 
authority in a form approved by the supreme court. ldaho Code $ 19-2914. 
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Although the facts of the Leader case were very different - having to do with 
arresting of criminal defendants versus compelling sureties to pay forfeited bonds - the 
arguments made by the individual bail agents were the same. The argument is that a bail 
agent may escape responsibilities or obligations by simply transferring employers. 
According to this argument, if a criminal defendant has jumped bail, a bail agent is no 
longer authorized to pursue him once that bail agent has changed suretiesijobs. Similarly, 
if a surety has failed to pay on a forfeited bond, a bail agent is not required to pursue 
collection from the surety once that bail agent has changed suretiesljobs. This Court 
rejected this argument in Leadev and the Fourth District asks this Court to reject this 
same argument again. 
IV. 
CONCLUSION 
The Fourth Judicial District Defendants ask this Court to hold that the Guidelines 
are a proper exercise of the authority of the Administrative District Judge. 
DATED this 26th day of January 201 0. 
STATE OF IDAHO 
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 
By -w 
MELISSA MOODY 
Deputy Attorney General 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
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MELISSA MOODY 
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I N  THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH 
JUDICIAL DISTRICT, STATE OF IDAHO 
WHEREAS, the Administrative Judge in each judicial district 
in the State of Idaho has been assigned administrative supervision 
and authority over the operation of the district courts within the 
district; and 
In Re: Guidelines for the 
~dministration of Bail Bonds 
In the Fourth Judicial District 
WHEREAS, in order to provide a method whereby the posting, 
acceptance and monitoring of bail bonds can be done in a consistent 
manner; and 
ADMINISTRATIVE 
ORDER 
WHEREAS, to establish a uniform system to enforce bond 
.- 
forfeiture orders of the court, and to provide a forum and process 
for hearing alleged violations of established rules and procedures 
regarding surety bonds; and 
WHEREAS, this court deems it important to establish a method 
to ensure that only qualified and duly licensed insurance agents 
are authorized to post surety bonds within the Fourth Judicial 
District 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that this Court does 
adopt the Guidelines for the Administration of Bail Bonds in the 
Fourth Judicial District, as attached, and that the same shall 
apply to and be observed by the Counties of Ada, Boise, Elmore and 
Valley. ... o 
DATED this L/q day 0 
~dministrative District Judge 
Fourth Judicial District 
GUIDELINES FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF BAIL BONDS 
IN THE FOURTH GUDICIAL DISTRICT 
SECTION I. FORFEITURE NOTTCES 
Forfeiture notices will be the only notice sent out to bondsmen. 
No subsequent billings will be sent out. 
Bondsmen will have ninety (90) calendar days from the date of the 
forfeiture notice to pay to the Clerk of the Court the full amount of 
the forfeiture or to produce the defendant or to have in the 
appropriate court file acceptable written documentation to excuse 
payment of the forfeiture. A defendant will not be considered to be 
produced before the court until the bondsman has filed with the court 
a properly executed vtSheriff's Certificate of Surrender" from the 
county Sheriff's Office from which the defendant in question was 
bonded resulting in the respective forfeiture, which document cannot 
be executed until the actual physical custody of the defendant has 
been remanded to that Sheriff's Office. 
All "sheriff's Certificates of Surrender" submitted by a bail 
- agent after a bond forfeiture shall include a statement indicating 
that the purpose of surrendering custody of the defendant is because 
the posted bond was forfeited by the court. 
If the bondsman is successful in remanding the custody of the 
defendant to the county Sheriff Is Office as set forth in the preceding 
paragraph, in addition to filing the Certificate of Surrender, he must 
also file with the court a motion and form order to discharge the 
undertaking as required by I.C. 19-2927. If the Certificate of 
Surrender is duly executed and timely filed with the court within the 
90-day time period, and if the requirements of Section X of these 
Guidelines have been satisfied, the court clerk shall be authorized 
and directed to secure the signature of the presiding judge on said 
order and then return to the bondsman a copy thereof along with the 
bond appearance papers and power of attorney. 
The Clerks of the District Court or their appointed deputies, or 
Court Clerks designated under Idaho Misdemeanor Criminal Rules 12, 
shall be responsible for reporting any and all violations of these 
guidelines to the Trial Court Administrator or his delegate, within 
GUIDELINES - Page 1 
Rev. 6-90; 3-92 
.- 
,.,. i: 
. . .* 
- one business day of the violation at which time the Trial Court 
Administrator or his delegate shall take immediate action against the 
named bail bond agent as set forth herein. 
SECTION 11. EXTENBIONB 
No extensions on forfeitures will be authorized by any person 
except as follows: 
a. Incarceration of the defendant in another 
jurisdiction; or 
b. physical incapacitation of the defendant. 
A. ~ncarceration of the Defendant in another jurisdiction 
If the defendant was incarcerated in another jurisdiction at the time 
the defendant was supposed to appear in court in this District, the 
bondsman must file with the court, within the 90-day time period, a 
written document signed by an authorized person of the incarcerating 
facility stating the name of the defendant, the date of defendant's 
@ - arrest, the reason for arrest, the status of the defendant's case in that jurisdiction, and the expected date of release. The court 
administrator or his delegate in this case will have discretion to 
authorize an extension. 
B. Phvsical Inca~acitation of the Defendant - The bondsman will 
be responsible to file with the court, within the 90-day time period, 
appropriate written documentation from the medical institution or 
supervising physician stating the exact street location of the 
defendant, why the defendant cannot be moved, date the incapacitation 
occurred, reason for incapacitation, and expected date of release. 
If the incapacitation occurred before the 90-day time period expired, 
the Trial court Administrator or his delegate will have discretion to 
authorize an extension. 
GUIDELINES - Page 2 
Rev. 1-91 
Magistrate Judges will not be approached by bondsman to secure 
extensions of forfeitures. Only the Trial Court Administrator or his 
delegate shall be authorized to grant extensions under the provisions 
of these guidelines. 
1f a bondsman desires an extension, he must file with the court, 
within the 90-day time period, a written Motion for Extension. Said 
motion must contain at least the full name and caption of the court 
and case, case number, reason for the extension, the length of the 
requested extension, the date and signature of the requesting 
bondsman. Any Motions for Extensions filed after the 90-day time 
period has lapsed will not be considered by the Trial Court 
Administrator or his delegate. There shall be no grounds for 
extensions other than those listed in these guidelines. 
~ l l  extensions authorized by the Trial Court Administrator or his 
delegate shall be on a uniform form entitled "AUTHORIZATION FOR 
EXTENSION OF BOND FORFEITURE", said form to be designed and provided 
by the Trial Court Administrator. Said form shall include at least 
the full name and caption of the court and case, case number, reason 
for extension, the length of the extension and any special terms and 
- 
conditions of the extension. In granting extensions, the Trial Court 
Administrator or his delegate shall have the right to make conditional 
the granting of the extension by placing any type or form of 
conditions on said extensions. The Clerk of the Court shall receive 
and file this form. The Clerk of the Court shall notify the Trial 
Court Administrator or his delegate immediately if the bail bondsman 
fails to comply with the terms and conditions or the time restrictions 
of said extension. 
If the Trial Court '~dministrator or his delegate denies any 
agent's Motion for Exoneration or Extension, he shall provide written 
notification of such to the filing agent listing therein the reasons 
for such action. 
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SECTION 111. BEVOCATION OF BONDS 
A. J3v the Bondsman - Prior to Forfeiture - I.C. 19-2924 
Before a bond will be considered by the court to be revoked by 
the bondsman, the bondsman must file with the court a properly 
executed "Sheriff's Certificate of Surrender" from the sheriff's 
office. This will require that the bondsman remand actual physical 
custody of the defendant to the county sheriff from which the 
defendant in question was bonded. The requirements of I.C. 19-2924 
must be followed in that the bondsman must give proper notice of his 
intent to revoke to the prosecuting attorney and submit to the court 
a form order exonerating the bond. No hearing is required if the 
prosecutor does not object and the clerk will then, after the five 
days has elapsed, secure the presiding judges' signature on the 
exoneration order and then return to the bondsman a copy of said 
executed order. 
All ''Sheriff's Certificates of Surrender" submitted by a bail 
agent pursuant to a bond revocation shall include a statement 
indicating that the purpose of surrendering custody of the defendant 
is to revoke the bond prior to forfeiture. 
- 
B. Bv the Prosecutor - The Prosecuting Attorney's Office has 
authority to request that the court revoke a defendant's bond on the 
grounds that the terms of release have been violated by the defendant. 
SECTION IV. VIOLATION OP GUIDELINES 
For good cause shown, the Administrative District Judge shall 
have authority to instruct all Sheriff's Offices within the Fourth 
Judicial District to refuse to accept any bail bonds posted by any 
bondsman or bail bonds business, or any bonds posted which are insured 
by any insurance company. "Good Cause" for exercising this authority 
shall include, but is not limited to: 
1. Failure of the bondsman to comply with any provisions 
of these guidelines. 
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2 .  Failure of the bondsman or insurance company to timely 
pay the court for any forfeiture as set forth in these 
guidelines. 
3 .  Violation by the bondsman or insurance company of  any 
rules or regulations promulgated and applicable to bondsmen 
or insurance companies by the Idaho Department of 
Insurance. 
4. Conviction of a bondsman or insurance company of any 
felony in any state or federal court within the United 
States. 
5 .  If in the conduct of his affairs, a bondsman or 
insurance company has used fraudulent or dishonest 
practices, or has shown himself to be incompetent, 
untrustworthy or a source of injury and loss to the public, 
the court or others. 
SECTION V. REQUIRED W I N G  BEFORE ADMINISTR&TIV& JUDGE 
- 
Before the Administrative District Judge shall issue an Order 
as set forth in section IV, above, the Trial Court Administrator or 
his delegate, who shall be responsible to oversee implementation of 
these guidelines, shall file with said Judge an Affidavit and 
petition requesting such action. Upon filing said Affidavit and 
Petition the Abinistrative Judge may issue an Order to Show Cause 
directed to the affected bondsman or insurance company giving a day 
and time certain on which the named bondsman or insurance company 
must appear and show cause why an order should not be issued which 
will prohibit the posting of any bail bonds by said bondsman or 
underwritten by said insurance company at any location within the 
Fourth Judicial District. 
After the Affidavit and Petition has been filed, the Court shall 
cause a copy thereof along with a copy of the executed Order to Show 
Cause to be personally served upon the named bondsman or insurance 
company at least five (5) business days prior to the date of the 
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hearing. Service upon the named insurance company shall be deemed 
complete by sending said documents to the bail division of the named 
insurance company by certified mail. 
If, at the hearing, the bondsman fails to show cause as required 
in the Order, the Administrative Judge may then issue the Order to 
refuse to accept any bail bonds posted by the named bondsman, his 
business, or bail bonds insured by the named insurance company. 
Said Order issued by the Administrative Judge may be permanent 
or temporary, and may also be conditional in the discretion of the 
Administrative District Judge. 
SECTION VI. AMENDMENTS TO GUIDELINES h APPLICATLON 
The Trial Court Administrator shall have the authority to amend 
any portion of these guidelines as he deems necessary for the 
efficient processing of bail bonds within the Fourth Judicial 
District. The guidelines shall apply to all locations within the 
.- 
boundaries of the Fourth Judicial District. 
SECTION VII. DEPARTMENT OF INBURANC& 
The Trial Court Administrator or his delegate shall inform the 
Compliance Officer of the Idaho Department of Insurance of any and 
all violations of these guidelines by any bail bond agent or 
insurance company. Violations shall also be reported to the 
respective County Prosecuting Attorney's Office for purposes of 
enforcement of default judgments or forfeiture orders. 
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SECTION VIII. DEFAULT JUDGMENTS 
Default judgments shall be issued by the court clerk one day 
after the 90-day time period in the event the bondsman: 
1. Fails to secure an extension from the Trial Court 
Administrator or his delegate; or 
2. Fails to file with the court a properly executed 
Sheriff's Certificate of Surrender; or 
3 .  Fails to pay the required amount of money to cover the 
forfeiture in question; or 
4 .  Fails to file with the court a properly executed Order 
of Exoneration of the bond in question, 
all in accordance with the provisions and time restrictions of these 
guidelines. 
SECTION IX. EICBNBE REOUIREMENT 
(3 UJ No bail bonds or surety bonds shall be accepted by any sheriff or Clerk of the District Court within the Fourth Judicial District 
from any person who is not duly licensed with the Idaho Department of 
Insurance, nor shall any bail bond or surety bond be accepted where 
said bond is insured by an insurance company, organization, business, 
or person which is not duly registered and approved to conduct 
business in the state of Idaho by the Idaho Department of Insurance. 
The Trial Court Administrator shall be responsible for providing 
all sheriff's within the Fourth Judicial District an updated list of 
those bail bond agents who are so qualified to post surety bonds. 
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SECTION X.  EXONERATXON OP FORFEITED BONDS 
Exoneration of forfeited bonds is a judicial, and not an 
administrative, function and thus must be formally achieved by an 
Order of the Court. 
Once a bond is ordered forfeited by the court, if the affected 
bail bond agent satisfactorily complies with all the requirements, 
including the time restrictions, of these guidelines, he shall be 
responsible for filing with the court a written Motion and Order for 
Exoneration of Forfeited Bond. When such a motion is filed, the 
court clerk shall notify the Trial Court Administrator, or his 
delegate, who shall after first reviewing the court file in the 
subject case, and after having concluded that all of said 
requirements have been satisfied, approve the Motion for Exoneration 
by affixing his signature and date thereof on the face of the motion. 
The Clerk of the Court will then submit the same to a judge for 
signature and filing. The signature of the Trial Court Administrator 
or his delegate on the motion will ensure the judge that all 
- requirements of the court have been satisfied by the bail agent. 
Once the signature of a judge is secured on the Order, the Clerk 
of the Court shall then return to the bail agent a copy of said 
order. 
No bondsman will be permitted to approach a judge for the 
purpose of securing a signature on an Order for Exoneration. 
In the event a bondsman, either pro se or through an attorney, 
files with the court a Motion for Exoneration of Forfeited Bond or a 
Motion for Exoneration of Bond, the Clerk of the Court shall 
immediately notify the Trial Court Administrator or his delegate of 
this action to allow him the opportunity to appear at all scheduled 
hearings to present evidence as to satisfactory or unsatisfactory 
compliance with these guidelines. 
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SECTION XI. $TACKING BONDS - PROHIBITED 
All surety bonds submitted to the court or to the custodian of 
an arrested person must be accompanied by a current, non-expired, and 
legal Power of Attorney. 
Only one Power of Attorney shall be submitted with each bond and 
the face value or face amount of said Power shall not exceed the 
amount of the bail or bond set by the Court in the case for which the 
bond and Power are being submitted. A bail agent shall not attempt 
to Itstack" bonds or Powers by submitting more than one Power of 
Attorney for any single bond. 
No Power of Attorney shall be submitted which has been altered 
or erased. 
No Power of Attorney shall be attempted to be submitted after the 
date of expiration, if any, on the face of the Power. 
No Power of Attorney shall be used more than once. 
SECTION XII. FAME 6r ADDRESS OF POSTING AGENT REOUIRED 
The face sheet of all surety bonds submitted to the court or to 
.- the custodian of an arrested person must contain the name and mailing 
address of the surety agent posting the same. 
This name and address must be typewritten, stamped in ink in 
typewritten form, or in pre-printed, typed form. It shall not be 
considered compliance with this Section to have the name and address 
included in handwritten form or any other form. 
This name and address shall be considered the "last known address 
of the person posting the undertaking of bailu for purposes of mailing 
and receiving notices of forfeiture and any other documents from the 
court. 
The Sheriffs or any person within the Fourth Judicial District 
having legal custody of any person shall have no authority to accept 
any surety bonds which do not comply with this Section, and no surety 
agent shall attempt to submit a surety bond which does not comply with 
this Section. 
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SECTION XIII. CHANGE OF ADDRESS. OR OTHER STATUB 
All surety agents authorized to post surety bonds within the 
Fourth Judicial District shall immediately notify the Trial Court 
Administrator of that District of any: 
1. Change of business or residential address of the 
surety agent: and 
2. Change of name or address of the surety agent's 
insurance company; and 
3 .  Change of insurance company who the surety agent 
will represent when posting surety bonds; and 
4. Change of phone number, business or personal, of 
the surety agent: and 
5. Change of supervising agent of the surety agent, 
or a change of employees/agents who the surety 
agent supervises; and 
6. Change of status of the surety agent on the 
records of the Idaho Department of Insurance; and 
.- 7. Change of the name of the business the surety 
agent works for or operates. 
~otification of any such changes must be done in writing and 
within five (5) business days from the date of the subject change. 
Failure to comply with this Section will be deemed a violation 
of these Guidelines and will subject the surety agent to the sanctions 
listed in Sections IV & V hereof. 
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I. 
INTRODUCTION 
In its "Cross-Appellants' Brief," Aladdin lists two issues for cross-appeal: 
(I) Did the district court err in concluding that the Fourth Judicial 
District has the authority to require bail agents to submit to a criminal 
history check? 
(2) Did the district court err in concluding that the Guidelines provide 
for adequate procedural protections for purposes of due process following a 
bail [agent's] attempt to rectify a violation identified by the TCA in a 
violation notice? 
Cross-Appellants' Opening Brief, p. 6. 
The first issue - whether the Fourth Judicial District has the authority to require 
bail agents to submit to a criminal history check - is contained within the larger 
discussion regarding the Fourth District's ability to regulate matters pertaining to bail. 
The Fourth District has argued in its Appellants' Brief that it is within the authority of the 
courts to "establish guidelines for bail bonds with regard to posting, forfeiture, 
exoneration and all other matters," which includes the authority to require bail agents to 
submit to a criminal history check. Idaho Supreme Court Order 2005; see also 
Appellants' Opening Brief, pp. 7-16. It adopts these arguments by reference and will not 
repeat those same arguments here. 
The second issue raised by Aladdin is whether the district court erred in 
concluding that a specific portion of the Guidelines provided adequate procedural 
protections for the purpose of due process. This issue is framed as a facial challenge to a 
specific portion the Guidelines, but is argued as an "as applied" challenge. Cross- 
Appellants' Opening Brief, pp. 18-21. Because it is not clear whether Aladdin is 
attacking the Guidelines on their face or as applied, the Fourth Judicial District addresses 
both arguments in this brief. 
11. 
ARGUMENT 
A. In Determining Whether the Guidelines Afford Bail Agents Due Process, the 
~ a t h e w s '  Test Does Not Apply Because There Is No Protected Property 
Interest; the Appropriate Test is "Arbitrary or Capricious" Behavior 
Aladdin rejects the District Court's facial versus as-applied framework for 
examining the process afforded by the Guidelines, erroneously contending that the 
District Court's "analysis was not appropriate in the procedural due process context." Id., 
p. 18. Aladdin urges this Court to instead adopt the Mathews three-factor balancing test 
to determine whether the Guidelines provide due process.2 
However, the Mathews' balancing test only applies to situations in which there is a 
protected property interest. Here, because there is no protected property intere~t ,~ 
Mathews does not apply. 
Although the Fourth District provided the District Court with case law supporting 
the proposition that bail agents have no protected property interest in writing bonds in a 
' Malhews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319,96 S. Ct. 893,47 L. Ed. 2d 18 (1976) 
Aladdin's position is confusing because these tests are not mutually exclusive. This Court does not need to choose 
one approach or the other. The District Court's faciallas-applied approach often goes hand-in-hand with the 
Mathews balancing test. 
See Appellants' Opening Brief, p. 17, noting that the courts that have addressed the question whether an individual 
has a property right or expectation in being on a list of approved bail agents have found that they do not. 
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particular county or jurisdiction, the Fourth District was not able to provide the District 
Court with the helpful case of Tunica County v. Harnpton Co. Nut. Sur., LLC, - So. 3d 
-, 2009 WL 1232704 (Miss. 2009), because the opinion was published after the 
District Court issued its ruling in this case. 
In Tunica County, the Mississippi Supreme Court, reversing the district court, held 
that a sheriff could refuse to accept bail bonds from a licensed bail agent. Although that 
case dealt with sheriffs and legislation, as opposed to courts and guidelines, the 
arguments were similar to the arguments being made in this case. 
In Tunica County, the sheriff removed a certain bail agency from the approved bail 
bonding roster after receiving a report from a circuit court judge that the bail agency was 
in arrears on bonds in three different cases. The bail agency sued the county, alleging 
that the sheriff unlawfully directed inmates away from their bonding company and 
unlawfully prohibited them from writing bonds in Tunica County. The bail agency 
argued that "the sheriff does not have authority t o  reject a bond tendered by a licensed 
professional bail-bonding agent, since [the Mississippi Code] expressly grants exclusive 
authority to the Mississippi Department of Insurance to deny, suspend, or revoke a 
license or to otherwise discipline a bail bondsman." Id. at "3. In rejecting this argument, 
and reversing the district court, the Mississippi Supreme Court upheld the sheriffs ability 
to refuse to accept bail from ceflain bail agents, noting that "[oJf course, the sheriffs 
discretion is not unfettered, and a sheriff must not act in an arbitrary or capricious 
manner." Id. at "5. 
Although the Mississippi Supreme Court never directly states that bail agents lack 
a protected property interest in writing bonds, the Tunica County opinion strongly implies 
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that this is the case by applying the "arbitrary and capricious" standard to the sheriffs 
conduct. Moreover, the Tunica County case was being watched by the federal Fifth 
Circuit on the very question of whether bail agents have a protected property interest in 
writing bail bonds in a particular county. 
In Hampton Co. Nat. Sur., LLC, v. Tunica County, Miss., 543 F.3d 221 (5" Cir. 
2008), the Fifth Circuit rejected a 5 1983 action in which the bail agency plaintiff argued 
that a property right arose from the state statutes that established the licensing and 
regulatory rules for bail bonds in Mississippi. The Fifth Circuit noted: 
there is recent state trial court authority that this Sheriff had no statutory 
authority to suspend these Plaintiffs; review of that judgment is pending in 
the Mississippi state appellate system ... The result may be to define the 
relevant rights of bail bondsmen. If a sheriff is found not to have the 
discretion exercised here, bail bondsmen might have a reasonable 
expectation that their right to write such bonds may not be taken. No 
discretion in the official and a reasonable expectation in the citizen are the 
central elements of a protected property interest. 
Id. at 226 (emphasis added.) The "pending case" referred to by the federal court was the 
Tunica County case discussed above, in which the Mississippi Supreme Court held that a 
sheriff does have the discretion to refuse to accept bonds from certain bail agents. 
Applying the Fifth Circuit's rationale to the Tunica County holding: bondsmen do not 
have a reasonable expectation that their right to write bonds in a certain county may not 
be taken. In other words, bail bondsmen have no property right in writing bonds in a 
particular district or locale. This is true in Mississippi, and it is true in Idaho. 
Because no property right is implicated, the constitutional test for the Guidelines is 
not Mathews, it is the standard set forth by the Mississippi Supreme Court - arbitrary and 
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capricious behavior. See also Spuler v. Pickar, 958 F.2d 103, 107 (5" Cir. 1992) 
(Assuming that plaintiff had protected property interest, the only substantive process due 
was the exercise of professional judgment in a non-arbitrary and non-capricious fashion); 
Megenitz v. Stenger, 27 F.3d 1120 (6th Cir. 1994) (Even if a law student had a substantive 
due process right not to be dismissed from law school, the law student failed to show how 
the dismissal from law school was arbitrary and capricious). 
B. The District Court Correctly Concluded that - on its Face - the Challenged 
Guideline Provides Due Process 
The District Court did not enjoin subsection three of the following Guideline: 
For violations listed in (I), (2), and (3) below, the Trial Court 
Administrator's Office may notify the bail agent, and any supervising 
agents of the bail agent, to correct the violation(s) within ten (10) calendar 
days. The notice will state the nature of the violation(s) and the date by 
which the violation(s) must be remedied. The date specified on the notice 
for rectifying the violation will be 10 calendar days from the date of the 
notice or the first working day after the 10" day if the loth day falls on a 
weekend or holiday. 
If the bail agent or the supervising agent has not rectified the violation by 
12:OO p.m. (noon) on the date specified by the notice, the names of the bail 
agent and the supervising agent will be immediately removed from the List 
of Authorized Bail Agents. If the removed bail agent is a supervising 
agent, all bail agents who have listed the supervising agent on their 
Application to Become an Authorized Bail Agent Within the Fourth 
Judicial District will also be removed from the list of authorized agents. 
(1) . . . 
(2) . . . 
(3) The bail agent has not provided to the Trial Court Administrator's 
Office a photocopy of the Idaho Resident Producer - General Lines license 
or Resident Producer - Surety Lines license as of the expiration date of the 
BRIEF OF CROSS RESPONDENTS - 5 
temporary license or has not provided a renewal Application and followed 
all requirements for renewal prior to the expiration date of the agent's 
license. 
If the affected bail agent believes the Trial Court Administrator has 
committed an error in hisiher intended action to remove the bail agent from 
the List of Authorized Bail Agents, he or she may, by the deadline stated in 
the notification letter, request the Trial Court Administrator to review the 
reasons for the intended action and/or may, by the deadline stated in the 
notification letter, file a petition with the Clerk of the Court for a hearing 
before the Administrative District Judge for review of the Trial Court 
Administrator's intended action. In the request to the Trial Court 
Administrator or in the petition, the bail agent shall clearly and concisely 
provide good cause why the removal should not occur. The Trial Court 
Administrator shall review any such request prior to any removal of the bail 
agent. If a petition has been filed, the bail agent or the attorney filing the 
petition on behalf of the bail agent shall immediately provide a copy of the 
filed petition to the Trial Court Administrator's Office, and the bail agent 
shall not be removed before a hearing is held. 
R., Vol. I, pp. 177-178 (Bail Bond Guidelines, I4(1)(B)). 
Aladdin argues that the District Court erred in not enjoining Guideline 14(1)(B)(3) 
because, according to Aladdin, the Guideline does not provide a bail agent with adequate 
process before the agent is removed from the list. Aladdin argues that due process 
requires that, in addition to a bail agent being notified of the Guidelines' requirements 
and the risk of removal from the list for non-compliance (first notification), and in 
addition to a bail agent being notified in writing of the TCA's intent to remove a specific 
agent from the list in 10 days for a violation (second notification), the TCA must 
additionally notify the bail agent a third time that -yes, the TCA's office really means it 
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-the bail agent is going to be removed from the list. This due process argument has no 
basis in the law. 
The concept of due process "is not a concept to be applied rigidly, [but] is a 
flexible concept calling for such procedural protections as are warranted by 
the particular situation." Generally, so long as a party is provided an 
"opportunity to be heard ... at a meaningful time and in a meaningful 
manner" due process requirements are met. 
Rammell v. Idaho State Dep't. of Agric., 147 Idaho 415, 420, 210 P.3d 523, 528 (2009) 
(internal citations omitted). 
According to the law, if a party is provided with an opportunity to be heard at a 
meaningful time and in a meaningful manner, due process is satisfied. The Guidelines 
provide bail agents with an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a 
meaningful manner. 
Under the challenged portion of the Guidelines, a bail agent may request a hearing 
when he receives the ten day notice of the TCA's intent to remove him from the approved 
Iist. This provides the bail agent with an opportunity to be heard before any action is 
taken to remove him from the list. In fact, if a bail agent requests a hearing on the TCA's 
intent to remove him from the list, "the bail agent shall not be removed before a hearing 
is held." R., Vol. I, p. 178. 
In addition to the opportunity to contest the TCA's intended action before being 
removed from the list, a bail agent may request another hearing after being removed 
from the Iist. On their face, these Guidelines satisfy the requirement of providing bail 
agents with an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. 
There is nothing facially unconstitutional about the process. 
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C. The District Court Correctly Concluded that - as Applied - the Challenged 
Guideline Provides Due Process 
In the February 6,2009 Order, the District Court wrote: 
To the extent that the basis either for rejecting an application to be placed 
on the Authorized List of Bail Agents or for removal from such list have 
been found within the authority of the ADJ, the provisions if properly 
followed meet minimal standards for constitutional due process, that is 
notice and a timely opportunity to be heard. 
R., Vol. 111, pp. 485-86. 
On appeal, Aladdin seems to be arguing that the District Court erred in not finding 
that the Guidelines deprived Mr. Garske of due process as applied.4 
Mr. Garske, a supervising bail agent at Aladdin, did not send his renewal 
application to the TCA's office as required under the Guidelines. The TCA's office 
notified him that he had ten days to rectify the situation - and submit his renewal 
application, including a criminal background check - before being removed from the list. 
He did not rectify the situation and was removed from the list. He was immediately 
reinstated on the list - four days later - when the TCA's office received the required 
paperwork, 
Mr. Garske argues on appeal that this factual scenario deprives him of due process 
under the Guidelines as applied because he "did everything under his power to comply" 
and because, according to Mr. Garske, "[a]lthough a bail agent can contest the alleged 
As with all of the issues raised to the District Court, the specific question of Mr. Garske's due process was moot 
and therefore, not properly before the Court. As the District Court noted, "[tJhe Bail Plaintiffs' claims for injunctive 
relief are not based upon any current or present actions or threatened actions under the Bail Guidelines ..." R., Vol. 
111, p. 459. However, the District Court found that there was evidence in the record to support Aladdin's position 
that the Fourth Judicial District was "likely to engage in actions similar to those identified in the record," and that 
"the issues raised in this action are the type of issues often presented to trial courts," and that it therefore had subject 
matterjurisdiction to decide the issues. R., Vol. 111, p. 460. 
violation before removal, the Guidelines provide for neither notice nor an opportunity to 
contest the TCA's rejection of an agent's attempt to "rectify" the violation." Cross- 
Appellants' Opening Brief, pp. 5, 14. There are several difficulties with this argument. 
First, while Mr. Garske may say that he did everything under his power to comply 
with the Guidelines, the fact is that he did absolutely nothing to comply until receiving 
the TCA's notice that he was already in violation of the Guidelines for failing to act 
before expiration of his producer's license. Second, the assertion that "the Guidelines 
provide for neither notice nor an opportunity to contest the TCA's rejection of an agent's 
attempt to 'rectify' the violation" is simply incorrect. If Mr. Garske's name remained off 
the list because the TCA "rejected" his attempts to rectify the violation, Section 14(B)(3) 
does provide Mr. Garske with an opportunity for a hearing. The real "problem" in Mr. 
Garske's case is that the TCA's office was so responsive to Mr. Garske coming into 
compliance that the very day the TCA's office received the required paperwork, he was 
back on the approved list. The swiftness of the remedy (being reinstated on the list) 
"deprived" Mr. Garske of the opportunity for a hearing to ask to be reinstated on the list. 
Had his problem not been solved without a hearing, Mr. Garske would have had every 
right under the Guidelines to a hearing. 
When viewed through the lens of analogy, the "due process" that Mr. Garske is 
seeking is absurd. Imagine that a bank customer bounces a check and the bank notifies 
the customer that it will cover that check and all additional insufficient-fund checks for 
the next ten days; however, after that, the bank will return all ISF checks and charge a 
fee. Receiving the bank's notice, the bank customer runs right out - doing everything in 
his power to rectify the situation - and obtains a huge sum from his Uncle Ervin in the 
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form of a personal check. Unbeknownst to the bank customer, Uncle Ervin's personal 
check isn't worth the paper it's written on, and the bank customer's checks begin to be 
returned. Fees accrue. The bank customer contends that, to comply with due process, the 
bank is required to notify him that his uncle's check bounced, and his attempts to rectify 
the situation have been unsuccessful before the bank can deprive him of property by 
returning his ISF checks. This is a silly argument which, if accepted, would grind 
administrative and regulatory wheels to a halt. 
The TCA's office is not a babysitter for delinquent bail agents. It was Mr. 
Garske's responsibility to provide the documents required under the Guidelines in 
conjunction with annual renewal of his producer's license; he did not do so. When he 
received notice that he was not in compliance with the Guidelines, it was his 
responsibility - not the TCA's - to bring himself into compliance. He did not do so in 
the timeframe provided. 
The Guidelines are quite explicit that "if the bail agent or the supervising agent has 
not rectified the violation by 12:OO p.m. (noon) on the date specified by the notice, the 
names of the bail agent and the supervising agent will be immediately removed from the 
List of Authorized Bail Agents." When Mr. Garske had failed to rectify the violation by 
noon on the date specified by the notice, the TCA's office immediately removed Mr. 
Garske and his sub-agents from the list. 
On appeal, Aladdin criticizes the TCA's office for following the Guidelines, with 
the strong implication that it is the TCA's responsibility to bring agents into compliance. 
Aladdin writes: "Here, had Mr. Garske known that his criminal history results had not 
arrived from ISP prior to his removal, he could have attempted to track those results 
down and provide them to the TCA. Rather than simply notifying Mr. Garske of the 
problem, two TCA staff members spent an entire afternoon removing Mr. Garske and the 
thirty-eight agents from the authorized list." Cross-Appellants' Opening Brief, p. 20. It 
was Mr. Garske's responsibility to know whether he has complied. It was not the TCA's 
job to track him down - again - to tell him he was still out of compliance. Surely due 
process does not require the TCA's office to call a bail agent every day after sending a 
notice of violation to ask: "Have you complied yet?" 
The TCA's office agrees that it was an enormous administrative burden for the 
TCA's office to follow the Guidelines in removing Mr. Garske and his sub-agents, but 
the TCA's office disagrees that this burden was created by the Guidelines, or by the lack 
of a third notice to Mr. Garske. The administrative burden was created by Mr. Garske's 
actions and his failure to comply in the first place. 
Aladdin has not met its burden of showing that the Guidelines - as applied to Mr. 
Garske - failed to provide adequate procedural process. The Guidelines, on their face 
and as applied, comport with the constitutional requirement of being heard in a 
meaningful time and manner. 
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111. 
CONCLUSION 
The Fourth District Defendants respectfully request that this Court uphold the 
Fourth Judicial District's ability to require criminal background checks of individual bail 
agents and affirm the District Court's holding that the Guidelines comply with procedural 
due process. 
DATED this 26th day of January 2010. 
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